Re: [SystemSafety] Risk Based Planning and Assessment - tank farms

From: Loebl, Andy < >
Date: Tue, 18 Dec 2012 14:51:11 -0500


Thanks Carl;
I will get your paper and then see if I can get the book! In my experience there are few people willing to agree, but I sense that most users of risk analysis do so more out of a desperation then because the trust experts. I have never yet experienced a truly well-grounded use of this process. I certainly am appalled that such is the norm for nuclear power facilities, like Fukashima, it is anyone's guess if we need to protect against a 50 year event or a 1000 year event. What's worse is that many of these experts get lulled into believing that this is year 1 of any such judgment.

Hi Jim;
I have served in several related positions in academia and research in the city/regional/industrial park/brownfields development arena. I have been a graduate school of planning professor and also served as the idea person and lead of the brownfield reutilization of formerly used nuclear facilities and land for the U.S. Department of Energy. I have worked a lot with city planning folks since my PhD. Is in sociology and Demography. As I mentioned to Carl, most of the planning folks seem to be looking into job risk mitigation. I have also worked in areas of industrial chemical storage and security. My experience is of the conventional wisdom/colloquial-corroborating kind. U.S. planners and land use management professionals have serious and conflicting issues and constituencies. These are of several types:

If you want more land use examples let me know.

andy

From: systemsafety-bounces_at_xxxxxx Sent: Tuesday, December 18, 2012 5:12 AM To: systemsafety_at_xxxxxx Subject: Re: [SystemSafety] Risk Based Planning and Assessment - tank farms

Andy,

You're definitely not alone in your thinking. An interesting book on the topic of risk assessment which is in agreement with your view is: The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable by Nicholas Taleb. I presented a paper at the Australian System Safety Conference in 2011 where I raised some of the problems I have encountered relating to risk assessments, one problem typically being an over reliance on 'expert judgement' (you can find the paper at http://www.isys-integrity.com/Papers.htm if you're interested). In my experience there is nearly always a need to improve the validity of safety assurance (i.e. risk assessment) claims through the use of meta-evidence (e.g.. present evidence about evidence to answer questions such as: who made the expert judgements?, how competent were they to do so? etc.).

Best Regards
Carl



Dr. Carl Sandom PhD CEng FIET MIEHF
Director and Consultant
iSys Integrity Limited
10 Gainsborough Drive
Sherborne
Dorset, DT9 6DR
United Kingdom

From: systemsafety-bounces_at_xxxxxx Sent: 18 December 2012 04:34
To: systemsafety_at_xxxxxx Subject: Re: [SystemSafety] Risk Based Planning and Assessment - tank farms

Andy,

Thanks for your thoughts on the subject.

In addition to natural hazards, I'm also interested in how effectively city planning departments make use of risk based planning and assessment for developing industrial areas near residential ones, e.g. jet fuel tank farms. I gather some recommendations were made in the UK after the Buncefield incident in 2005, but regulations are still in the works in the UK since nothing has been published yet.

Jim

COMAH - Buncefield: Why did it happen? - HSE http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/buncefield/buncefield-report.pdf

Learning the Lessons from Buncefield
http://www.dsb.no/Global/Farlige%20stoffer/Dokumenter/Sevesokonferanse%202010/Sevesokonferansen%202010%20-%20Learning%20the%20lessons%20from%20Buncefield.pdf

RE: [SystemSafety] Risk Based Planning and Assessment

Date:

Mon, 17 Dec 2012 10:51:41 -0500

From:

Loebl, Andy <loeblas_at_xxxxxx

To:

James Ronback <jim_ronback_at_xxxxxx

My experience in the United States is with the Department of Homeland Security and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

To me risk based planning and assessment processes to not hold my confidence. Even probabilistic risk assessment

methods, as employed here, seems both weak and unsubstantiated. To me, the practice is based on "expert judgment"

which I interpret as someone, somewhere, is guessing and somehow this is codified and legitimatized. Unless, of

course, there is someone higher up in the decision making process who disagrees with the expert judgment, for

personal, political, or even professional reasons and decides to change that judgment, which in turn becomes

codified and legitimatized.

For example, regardless of the probability, how many mega-quakes, like Yellowstone, are we willing to accept?

Since the average frequency has been ~600,000 years between eruptions and the last one was 640,000 years ago,

does that mean we should move out of the areas likely to be affected or what should those people living in the

affected areas do? Mt. Fugi is another example. People in Japan have populated the hillsides of the volcano,

and like Mt. St. Helens, Fugi will erupt certainly soon, in geologic time, but what should be done today?

In short, the only way to really have confidence in the guessing that goes into even the best risk assessments,

users of those assessments cannot be allowed to use those assessments at a scale for which it is not intended.

Determining risk values, as the U.S. Coast Guard and homeland security does, and quantifies the results at an

interval scale, to my way of thinking, is taking 'judgment' too far.

I think I am alone at this thought. I also have not studied my objections enough to offer alternatives. I hope

all this makes sense to you.

andy

-----Original Message-----

On Behalf Of James Ronback

Sent: Sunday, December 16, 2012 5:17 PM

To: systemsafety_at_xxxxxx

Subject: [SystemSafety] Risk Based Planning and Assessment

Which countries have risk based planning and assessment processes that

you would recommend or deprecate?

Jim Ronback, P. Eng. (System Safety Engineer - retired)


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