Re: [SystemSafety] Spanish train crash

From: Eliop < >
Date: Tue, 6 Aug 2013 14:44:53 +0200


2013/8/6 M Mencke <menckem_at_xxxxxx

>
>
> Given the quantity of information sources, I would rather not draw any
> conclusions at this time.
>
>
>

This is the most sensible conclusion at present. You wouldn't believe the loads of 'expert information' we are suffering here, in Spain.

>
> 2013/8/6 Matthew Squair <mattsquair_at_xxxxxx >
>> All,
>>
>> A Galician friend sent me this link. According to this source ADIF (the
>> spanish administrator of state railways) has now installed additional ASFA
>> beacons (balise) to the section of track at which the accident occurred.
>>
>>
>> http://www.publico.es/461112/fomento-asume-que-tres-balizas-habrian-evitado-el-accidente-del-alvia
>>
>> The International Railway Journal also reports that the transition from
>> high speed to conventional line where the accident occurred was only
>> intended as a temporary link until the high speed line was extended towards
>> A Coruna, although that extension has been deferred.
>>
>> Finally the driver's testimony indicates that immediately prior to the
>> accident he was on the phone with the on-board ticket inspector (who had
>> rung him) and they were discussing which station platform to stop at,
>> testimony by the ticket inspector supports the drivers statements. Crew cab
>> background noise retrieved from the recorder indicates the driver may also
>> have been consulting a document of some kind.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Jul 30, 2013 at 1:57 AM, <
>> peter.sheppard_at_xxxxxx >>
>>>
>>> Chris,
>>>
>>> That was the point I was making, even following the application of
>>> "technology" to Morpeth Curve (albeit a fairly crude AWS warning), there
>>> were still derailments.
>>>
>>> At Southall AWS and ATP were both fitted, but turned off at the time of
>>> the accident.
>>>
>>> At Ladbroke Grove, the train that passed the red signal had not been
>>> fitted with ATP, but the HST approaching had (albeit having passed any
>>> measures that may have applied the brakes).
>>>
>>> At Wembley there was a accident with a suburban unit running into the
>>> rear of a freightliner train as a result of repetitive cancelling on the
>>> AWS (AWS only discriminates between green and "not green")
>>>
>>> Regardless of technology, it is the human and degraded modes that must
>>> be considered in all system designs.
>>>
>>> Cheers
>>>
>>> Peter
>>> (Speaking for himself)
>>>
>>> Peter Sheppard
>>> Senior Safety Engineer and Validator
>>>
>>> Mobile: +44 7920 247931
>>>
>>>
>>> Please consider the environment before you print / Merci de penser à
>>> l'environnement avant d'imprimer / Bitte denken Sie an die Umwelt bevor Sie
>>> drucken
>>>
>>> Bombardier Transportation UK Ltd
>>> Registered Office: Litchurch Lane, Derby, DE24 8AD, England
>>> TEL +44 1332 344666, FAX +44 1332 266271
>>> Registered in England
>>> Registration No. 2235994
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *"Chris Dale" <chris.dale_at_xxxxxx >>> Sent by: systemsafety-bounces_at_xxxxxx >>> 29/07/2013 16:38
>>> To
>>> <systemsafety_at_xxxxxx >>> cc
>>> Subject
>>> Re: [SystemSafety] Spanish train crash
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Thank you, Peter.
>>>
>>> Surely the lesson of the Morpeth derailments is that speed limits on
>>> tight curves need to be enforced technologically, not merely procedurally
>>> by the imposition of speed limits.
>>>
>>> According to Prof. Roger Kemp of Lancaster University, quoted by MSN,
>>> the accident in Spain occurred on a section of ‘half completed’ track that
>>> was still being brought up to date with the safety standards of the
>>> European Rail Traffic Management System, which would have prevented the
>>> train from exceeding the speed on the section of track. *
>>> http://news.uk.msn.com/world/why-spains-horror-train-crash-cant-happen-in-the-uk569032
>>> *<http://news.uk.msn.com/world/why-spains-horror-train-crash-cant-happen-in-the-uk569032>
>>>
>>> If this is true, the driver should not be the only one under
>>> investigation.
>>>
>>> Chris Dale
>>> (also speaking for himself only)
>>>
>>> *From:* systemsafety-bounces_at_xxxxxx >>> systemsafety-bounces_at_xxxxxx >>> peter.sheppard_at_xxxxxx >>> Sent:* 29 July 2013 13:35*
>>> To:* systemsafety_at_xxxxxx >>> Subject:* Re: [SystemSafety] Spanish train crash
>>>
>>>
>>> I have just one comment - "Morpeth" 1969, 1984, 1994!
>>>
>>> Cheers
>>>
>>> Peter
>>> (Speaking on behalf of himself only)
>>>
>>> Peter Sheppard
>>> Senior Safety Engineer and Validator
>>>
>>> Mobile: +44 7920 247931
>>>
>>>
>>> Please consider the environment before you print / Merci de penser à
>>> l'environnement avant d'imprimer / Bitte denken Sie an die Umwelt bevor Sie
>>> drucken
>>>
>>> Bombardier Transportation UK Ltd
>>> Registered Office: Litchurch Lane, Derby, DE24 8AD, England
>>> TEL +44 1332 344666, FAX +44 1332 266271
>>> Registered in England
>>> Registration No. 2235994
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *
>>> "Chris Dale" <**chris.dale_at_xxxxxx >>> Sent by: *systemsafety-bounces_at_xxxxxx >>> 29/07/2013 12:41
>>> To
>>> <*systemsafety_at_xxxxxx >>> >
>>> cc
>>> Subject
>>> Re: [SystemSafety] Spanish train crash
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> PBL wrote:
>>>
>>> > 11. I read in the Observer (Sunday paper of the Guardian group) that
>>> the
>>> driver
>>> > has been arrested, arraigned in handcuffs before a judge, and charged
>>> with
>>> > multiple manslaughter.
>>> >
>>> > That is, of course, an excellent way to ensure that investigators (of
>>> any
>>> kind)
>>> > obtain minimal useful information about any human factors at play in
>>> this
>>> > accident. Indeed, the article reports that he has received legal advice
>>> not to
>>> > make a statement to police.
>>>
>>> Hear, hear!
>>>
>>> If some technological failure caused the accident, we need to know.
>>>
>>> If some technology misled, confused or distracted the driver at a
>>> critical
>>> moment, we need to know.
>>>
>>> If some technology that should have intervened was absent, switched off,
>>> or
>>> otherwise ineffective, we need to know.
>>>
>>> The (seemingly) media-led frenzy to find someone to blame is an obstacle
>>> to
>>> the prevention of future accidents. Even if the technology is not at
>>> fault,
>>> we should still be asking what would lead an experienced, well-qualified
>>> driver to act (or not act) in the way he did. Then we have a chance of
>>> improving things. We won't if the 'blame game' takes priority.
>>>
>>> Chris Dale
>>> Safety-Critical Systems Club Meetings Co-ordinator
>>> *
>>> **chris.dale_at_xxxxxx >>> Tel: +44 (0)1326 565758
>>> Mobile: +44 (0)7904 056507*
>>> **www.scsc.org.uk* <http://www.scsc.org.uk/>
>>>
>>> Director
>>> Dale Research Ltd
>>> 2 Reppersfield Row, Breage, Helston TR13 9PG
>>> Registered in England and Wales no: 4937941
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>
>>
>> --
>> *Matthew Squair*
>> *
>> *
>> Mob: +61 488770655
>> Email: MattSquair_at_xxxxxx >>
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The System Safety Mailing List
systemsafety_at_xxxxxx Received on Tue Aug 06 2013 - 14:45:02 CEST

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