Re: [SystemSafety] Hazard and Qualitative-Risk Analysis of Mode 3 Charging of Electric Road Vehicles

From: Andrew Rae < >
Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2013 16:07:14 +0100


Peter,
The only comment I can make until the document is in English is to applaud you and the committee for opening it to public peer review.

I don't know the direction of cause and effect but the difference in quality between open and closed risk assessments in my collection is marked. This doesn't stop a prevailing culture of secrecy.

I look forward to the English version, and I hope you will consider publishing the received comments to the extent permitted by confidentiality.

Drew
On 21 Oct 2013 15:50, "Peter Bernard Ladkin" <ladkin_at_xxxxxx wrote:

> For the last couple of years, a committee I chair in the
> standardardisation organisation for
> electrotechology in Germany, the DKE, has been working on a hazard
> analysis and risk analysis of the
> recharging procedure for electric road vehicles.
>
> A year ago, we completed a draft high-level analysis for charging vehicles
> in so-called "Mode 3",
> that is, using charging transformers, "charging stations", affixed to the
> infrastructure, say at the
> roadside or in/on a building.
>
> We are now considering Mode 2 charging, in which a portable
> transformer/control device called an
> "In-Cable Control Protective Device" or ICCPD is attached by a cable to a
> non-dedicated circuit, say
> a building circuit, on one side and to the vehicle to be charged on the
> other.
>
> Oddly, the project to perform a HazAn/RiskAn is controversial, despite
> that the IEC Guide on Safety
> says that all safety-related standardisation projects should incorporate a
> HazAn/RiskAn phase into
> their process requirements. The DKE performed the HazAn/RiskAn because the
> charging infrastructure,
> from fixed circuits to charging stations to the cables connected them to
> the car, do not otherwise
> fall under a single entity, a company say, with end-to-end responsibility
> for the entire system.
>
> Risk Analysis would normally require an assignment of numbers
> (probabilities or likelihoods) to
> certain events happening, as required by say fault trees or event trees.
> We can't do that, because
> no numbers are available for a new process such as this. So qualitative
> risks must be assessed. We
> used a spec'd-down version of OHA for the hazard analysis and qualitative
> event trees to indicate risks.
>
> The HazAn document is published now under the editorial names of myself
> and Bernd Sieker. Many
> people contributed, but because of the sensitivity of commercial companies
> to their markets, other
> contributors wished not to be named. They do include some very good
> electrical engineers indeed,
> with whom I am delighted to have the privilege of working.
>
> At the suggestion of the Committee, the Mode 3 document is currently
> available, at the moment only
> in German, at
> http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publications/Papers/HazAn_2012_09_13-pub.pdf. It is
> deliberately short and simple to read, and we hope technically accessible.
> An English version will
> slowly take shape.
>
> Comments are *very* welcome.
>
> PBL
>
> --
> Prof. Peter Bernard Ladkin, Faculty of Technology, University of
> Bielefeld, 33594 Bielefeld, Germany
> Tel+msg +49 (0)521 880 7319 www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> The System Safety Mailing List
> systemsafety_at_xxxxxx >



The System Safety Mailing List
systemsafety_at_xxxxxx Received on Mon Oct 21 2013 - 17:07:21 CEST

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.0 : Thu Apr 25 2019 - 19:17:06 CEST