Re: [SystemSafety] Hazard and Qualitative-Risk Analysis of Mode 3 Charging of Electric Road Vehicles

From: Mike Ellims < >
Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2013 17:26:29 +0100


There are some major differences,

For example the Tesla superchargers can supply 80% of a complete charge in 30 minutes.

ABB's inductive bus charger can charge a bus in 30 seconds. It uses super capacitors to buffer the grid and provide fast discharge.  

Cheers.  

From: systemsafety-bounces_at_xxxxxx [mailto:systemsafety-bounces_at_xxxxxx Rolf Spiker
Sent: 21 October 2013 16:39
To: Andrew Rae; Peter Bernard Ladkin
Cc: systemsafety_at_xxxxxx Subject: Re: [SystemSafety] Hazard and Qualitative-Risk Analysis of Mode 3 Charging of Electric Road Vehicles  

Hi Peter,  

I am able to read that document for 90%.

I have no comment on the approach to classify the potential dangers.

I know what can going wrong charging batteries.

But...

Charging batteries is an old and still existing event.

All the cars are charging their batteries when they drive.

I have a boat and most boat owners are charging their batteries if they in a marina.

I am an electronic engineer and know a lot of batteries by personal experience and reading literature.  

Now we have electric cars with batteries.

We have already electric driven forklift trucks and charging equipment for a long time.  

Now we make all kind of studies about potential hazards charging batteries in cars.  

What is the difference with that car battery and charging equipment that we have to make these studies now?  

Is there anything news under the sun?  

Functional Safety, Security & Reliability > <http://www.exida.com/> www.exida.com

To view our Equipment database with certified elements go to: <http://www.sael-online.com/> www.sael-online.com

cid:image004.png_at_xxxxxx

The information in this e-mail is confidential and intended solely for the person to whom it is addressed. If this message is not addressed to you, please be aware that you have no authorization to read the rest of this e-mail, to copy it or to furnish it to any person other than the addressee. Should you have received this e-mail by mistake, please bring this to the attention of the sender, after which you are kindly requested to destroy the original message. Exida.com cannot be held responsible or liable in any way whatsoever for and/or in connection with any consequences and/or damage resulting from the proper and complete dispatch and receipt of the content of this e-mail.      

From: systemsafety-bounces_at_xxxxxx [mailto:systemsafety-bounces_at_xxxxxx Andrew Rae
Sent: Monday, October 21, 2013 5:07 PM
To: Peter Bernard Ladkin
Cc: systemsafety_at_xxxxxx Subject: Re: [SystemSafety] Hazard and Qualitative-Risk Analysis of Mode 3 Charging of Electric Road Vehicles  

Peter,
The only comment I can make until the document is in English is to applaud you and the committee for opening it to public peer review.

I don't know the direction of cause and effect but the difference in quality between open and closed risk assessments in my collection is marked. This doesn't stop a prevailing culture of secrecy.

I look forward to the English version, and I hope you will consider publishing the received comments to the extent permitted by confidentiality.

Drew

On 21 Oct 2013 15:50, "Peter Bernard Ladkin" <ladkin_at_xxxxxx wrote:

For the last couple of years, a committee I chair in the standardardisation organisation for
electrotechology in Germany, the DKE, has been working on a hazard analysis and risk analysis of the
recharging procedure for electric road vehicles.

A year ago, we completed a draft high-level analysis for charging vehicles in so-called "Mode 3",
that is, using charging transformers, "charging stations", affixed to the infrastructure, say at the
roadside or in/on a building.

We are now considering Mode 2 charging, in which a portable transformer/control device called an
"In-Cable Control Protective Device" or ICCPD is attached by a cable to a non-dedicated circuit, say
a building circuit, on one side and to the vehicle to be charged on the other.

Oddly, the project to perform a HazAn/RiskAn is controversial, despite that the IEC Guide on Safety
says that all safety-related standardisation projects should incorporate a HazAn/RiskAn phase into
their process requirements. The DKE performed the HazAn/RiskAn because the charging infrastructure,
from fixed circuits to charging stations to the cables connected them to the car, do not otherwise
fall under a single entity, a company say, with end-to-end responsibility for the entire system.

Risk Analysis would normally require an assignment of numbers (probabilities or likelihoods) to
certain events happening, as required by say fault trees or event trees. We can't do that, because
no numbers are available for a new process such as this. So qualitative risks must be assessed. We
used a spec'd-down version of OHA for the hazard analysis and qualitative event trees to indicate risks.

The HazAn document is published now under the editorial names of myself and Bernd Sieker. Many
people contributed, but because of the sensitivity of commercial companies to their markets, other
contributors wished not to be named. They do include some very good electrical engineers indeed,
with whom I am delighted to have the privilege of working.

At the suggestion of the Committee, the Mode 3 document is currently available, at the moment only
in German, at
http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publications/Papers/HazAn_2012_09_13-pub.pdf . It is
deliberately short and simple to read, and we hope technically accessible. An English version will
slowly take shape.

Comments are *very* welcome.

PBL

--
Prof. Peter Bernard Ladkin, Faculty of Technology, University of Bielefeld,
33594 Bielefeld, Germany
Tel+msg +49 (0)521 880 7319 <tel:%2B49%20%280%29521%20880%207319>
www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de




_______________________________________________
The System Safety Mailing List
systemsafety_at_xxxxxx





_______________________________________________ The System Safety Mailing List systemsafety_at_xxxxxx
Received on Mon Oct 21 2013 - 18:27:08 CEST

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.0 : Thu Apr 18 2019 - 22:17:06 CEST