Re: [SystemSafety] NYTimes: The Next Accident Awaits

From: Matthew Squair < >
Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2014 21:47:39 +1100


As I remember according to a study by the UK HSE both the Netherlands and Denmark do better than the UK in various safety outcomes.

So perhaps we should actually be asking the Dutch and the Danes what they're doing right?

In general I'm cautious about saying well it's this technique or that process that makes the difference. What we observe is that different states have different approaches and different accident rates. But causation is way more difficult to prove.


Matthew Squair

MIEAust, CPEng
Mob: +61 488770656
Email; Mattsquair_at_xxxxxx

On 31 Jan 2014, at 8:08 pm, "RICQUE Bertrand (SAGEM DEFENSE SECURITE)" < bertrand.ricque_at_xxxxxx

Hi Nancy,

Concerning France you are right, and in that case I think that the cultural aspect dominates. There is no safety culture in the population as in UK, as acknowledged after AZF accident. The risk stops at the fence of the plant and you can safely build your house on the other side ... The regulations have changed since but not the cultures. The safety engineers concerned by the new regulations live a nightmare as the choices are more or less, dismantle the plant versus dismantle the town ... I think that the safety cultures have more impact on the final result than the competence of the safety community.

Bertrand Ricque

Program Manager

Optronics and Defence Division

Sights Program

Mob : +33 6 87 47 84 64

Tel : +33 1 59 11 96 82


*From:* systemsafety-bounces_at_xxxxxx mailto:systemsafety-bounces_at_xxxxxx
*On Behalf Of *Nancy Leveson
*Sent:* Thursday, January 30, 2014 8:59 PM
*To:* systemsafety_at_xxxxxx *Subject:* Re: [SystemSafety] NYTimes: The Next Accident Awaits

It would be nice to actually introduce some data into the discussions on this list. First, although it is very true that the U.K. has excellent comparative occupational safety statistics, this exceptional performance predated safety cases by at least 100 years and is as much a cultural artifact of the U.K. as any current practices. While the rest of the world was suffering the results of steam engine explosions in the late 1800s, for example, Great Britain was the first to implement measures to reduce them. (I wrote a paper on this once if anyone is interested.) Although the British citizens on this list know more about the history of the UK HSE, I believe they were the first country to require companies to have safety policies, etc., after the Flixborough explosion. Safety cases, I believe, came into being only after the more recent Piper Alpha explosion.

Trying to tie accident rates in different countries to particular ways of regulating safety is dicey at best. First, there are significant differences between the engineering, agricultural, industry, and service rates of accidents in countries, often related to technical differences. Some have high agricultural accident rates but low service accident rates. For example, accident rates are going to be very different in a country with high tech agricultural techniques compared to those still plowing fields with a pair of oxen. Politics plays an even more important role. For example, western countries often put very dangerous processes and plants in third world countries or governments in these countries do not have laws that require manufacturers to use even minimal safety practices in manufacturing, for example, and they will not as long as they need the revenue and jobs. The safety culture in these countries will not change magically by using one type of regulatory regime.

Note also, that there are vast differences in industries. Those with the very safest records, such as the U.S. SUBSAFE program, do not use safety cases. (And they have managed to have an incredible safety record despite being in the U.S. :-)). If we want to compare the effectiveness of different regulatory regimes, then we need to provide scientific evaluations and not just misuse statistics (which may involve factors that have nothing to do with the actual regulatory regime used).

Also, as Michael Holloway noted, culture differences will make different types of regulation more or less different in different countries and industries.

Finally, I would like to point out to those who are making some national comparisons and putting down the U.S. in comparison with France, for example, that the fatal occupational accident rate in the U.S. is less than that of France. Perhaps we can avoid mixing politics and chauvinism with science on this list.


On Thu, Jan 30, 2014 at 8:50 AM, Martyn Thomas < martyn_at_xxxxxx

I'm a non-exec Director at the UK's Health and Safety Laboratory ( We carry out the basic research that underpins the UK's regulation of occupational health and safety, ranging from reducing accidents on construction sites and improving the tethering of loads on lorries, through to reproducing and analysing major explosions (such as Buncefield - and destruction-testing the physical integrity of tankers and rolling-stock.

We also undertake commercial work that uses our unusual experimental and analysis capabilities and very strong science base.

The UK is unusual in having a goal-based, safety-case regulatory regime and a regulator (HSE) with its own expert research establishment (HSL). We are getting an increasing number of approaches from Governments in the Far and Middle East who see the UK's good performance in occupational Health and Safety and who want to investigate setting up similar goal-based regulation.

Maybe there is something in the HSE/HSL approach that the US chemical industry could benefit from.


Martyn Thomas CBE FREng

On 29/01/2014 22:05, Peter Bernard Ladkin wrote:

A worthy opinion piece from the Chair of the US Chemical Safety Board. Note his suggestion that identifying hazards and mitigation is just well-established best practice. I can say from experience that it is not yet in Europe in all industries with safety aspects, even though he holds Europe up as having a factor of three fewer chemical accidents as the US.

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Received on Fri Jan 31 2014 - 11:47:54 CET

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