Re: [SystemSafety] Safety Case Standards and Experience

From: jean-louis Boulanger < >
Date: Thu, 6 Feb 2014 09:58:51 +0100

Actually for all project we used the 50129 for different level ( equipement, sub sys, sys, sys of sys) and it work The french authority request specific SC but the content is very similar

The Idea of 50129 is very interestîng ;
Démonstrateurs that you manage 3 aspects:

- the quality
- the safety
- the solution

Le jeudi 6 février 2014, Tracy White <tracyinoz_at_xxxxxx

> I am familiar with the safety case structure in 50129, but the issue I
> have (which is the same for any prescription) is that it does not
> necessarily draw out those aspects having an effect safety which are
> peculiar to your project. Not all projects will have the same logistical,
> governance, subcontractor and international/national safety considerations
> to deal with, all of which will need to be demonstrated/argued to have been
> effectively addressed so far as they potentially impact safety.
> For fear of introducing a new term, increasingly of late (on a number of
> projects) we have been talking in terms of 'systems and safety' assurance
> arguments rather that simply a 'safety case'. I see that as a sensible
> approach as safety is not simply about the safety program. The safety
> outcome is equally dependent on a effective systems engineering program for
> delivering a safe product, which then raises additional assurance claims
> against technical competency, appropriate engineering oversight and
> authorities, effective V&V, CM etc.
> The safety program is simply one source if requirements generation and
> good systems engineering following recognised engineering good practice,
> will deliver an inherent level of safety; an assurance argument needs to
> talk to both elements as minimum.
> Regards, Tracy
> On 5 Feb 2014, at 21:44, jean-louis Boulanger <
> jean.louis.boulanger_at_xxxxxx > wrote:
> Hello
> I am an ISA in railway domain and i assessed many safetycase
> On the railway domain the 50129 introduced the structure and the content
> of the safetycase
> The safetycase is ALSTOM used when you request the autorisation for
> opération of new line
> Le mercredi 5 février 2014, Les Chambers <les_at_xxxxxx >
> Peter
> Many thanks for this list. What a stout fellow you are. It's a great
> reference or for anyone attempting to identify the current
> "state-of-the-art" in safety cases.
> I encourage anyone on the list who is aware of a safety case deliverable
> or process standard, not identified here, to add to this thread.
> Further, I encourage anyone with experience of preparing a safety case to
> give us their thoughts.
> Also, is anyone aware of system level product standards that may exist in
> any application domain. Standards that mandate various high-level design
> approaches as mentioned in Nancy's article ["Product: Specific design
> features are required, which may be (a) specific designs or (b) more
> general features such as fail-safe design or the use of protection
> systems."]. By "system level" I mean pertaining to the overall design of
> the system, not a component thereof. I would call an electrical
> installation a component.
> I am aware of texts such as "P. Clements et al., Documenting Software
> Architectures: Views and Beyond, 2nd ed., Pearson Education, 2010" but have
> not seen any ISO/IEC/CENELEC/DoD or other standards, in the public domain,
> that could be called out in a development contract or used to certify
> generic classes of systems. For these to be useful they need to be specific
> enough to support a comply/not comply judgement. Because design approaches
> are often tied to company intellectual property you don't often see this
> stuff in the public domain. For example, in my chemical processing days,
> the design of a latex reactor control system, at least at the strategic
> level, was a copy and paste exercise. I could tell you about it but then
> I'd have to kill you.
> In another life I spent a year leafing through the American Nuclear
> Regulatory Commission standards with the objective of developing a NUREG
> compliant system development methodology for a control system that would
> perform emergency reactor shutdown. I did not encounter any constraints or
> guidelines on the design approach. But that was some time ago.
> I look forward to any and all contributions.
> Les
> ---------------------------------------
> From Prof. Peter Bernard Ladkin, Faculty of Technology, University of
> Bielefeld, 33594 Bielefeld, Germany
> Oh, my!
> A random Google search for the term "safety case" is as least as likely to
> turn up this discussion
> as anything else. That's not necessarily how you go about finding out what
> the term might mean. (My
> search turns up Nancy's paper in the first fifteen. Given the current
> discussion, I am tempted to
> regard that as *proof* that such a search isn't going to tell you what the
> term might mean :-) ).
> A *goal

Mr Jean-louis Boulanger

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