Re: [SystemSafety] Safety Cases

From: Matthew Squair < >
Date: Mon, 10 Feb 2014 23:10:52 +1100


A deeper question might be, why do we think that we can easily distinguish between a design that might 'go right' and one that will 'go wrong'?

Matthew Squair

MIEAust, CPEng
Mob: +61 488770655
Email; Mattsquair_at_xxxxxx
Web: http://criticaluncertainties.com

On 10 Feb 2014, at 10:43 pm, Michael Jackson <jacksonma_at_xxxxxx

Felix:

Yes. But surely there is a missing prior question here:

0. What constitutes going right?

How can we discuss 'going wrong' without a clear understanding of 'going right'?
Yet in much discussion of safety this question seems to be relegated to a tacit
background understanding.

At 11:19 10/02/2014, nfr wrote:

In the 1980s, 'the safety case' was defined as having the purpose of answering three questions:

  1. What could [possibly] go wrong?
  2. Why won't it?
  3. But what if it did?

One or two of you might propose that each of these questions could be answered by a single sentence. But, with a bit of thought, you'll recognise that, in order to answer the questions fully, a great deal of evidence must be adduced, from a great deal of work - from complete and correct specification, through thorough design, hazard ID, risk assessment, etc., to emergency planning.

Felix.


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