Re: [SystemSafety] Logic

From: Nick Lusty < >
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2014 12:38:36 +0000

Sad to say, this is a situation that I see time and time again, and it inevitably leads to problems in validating safety critical systems. Verification of the code to low level design through low level module testing providing MC/DC coverage is easy, but demonstrating that the system validly accurately meets the unformed user requirements is much harder. Using formal methods to create the requirements is one way of addressing this, as it leaves fewer corners for ambiguities to hide. Z was used extensively for iFACTS, and on a couple of other projects I have worked on have used a variety of logic tables to specify requirements where possible.


On 19/02/2014 12:28, Michael J. Pont wrote:
> The companies that I deal with
> produce systems ranging from aerospace systems to household appliances.
> In many cases (probably the majority of cases that I see), there is limited
> evidence of "process" or documentation available from the "embedded team"
> when I arrive at the company door. Requirements documents are often*very*
> basic, if they exist at all.

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systemsafety_at_xxxxxx Received on Wed Feb 19 2014 - 13:38:54 CET

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