[SystemSafety] Paper on Software Reliability and the Urn Model

From: Peter Bernard Ladkin < >
Date: Wed, 25 Feb 2015 10:00:54 +0100

I have recently been involved in discussions concerning rewriting IEC 61508-7:2010 Annex D, a short informative section attempting to explain the statistical evaluation of the reliability of SW for which there is an operational history.

Lots of things come up. People don't understand what the urn model has to do with software evaluation. I have recently experienced reliability experts making incorrect claims, and non-experts finding it difficult to adjudicate those claims. I've been discussing these matters with Bev Littlewood and Jens Braband.

I think there is a need for some clarity. I am (amongst other things) an experienced mathematician, but I find most applied-statistics textbooks almost impenetrable, and it's clear that it's worse for people who don't have even my background. The very best explanation I have ever found of the basics of statistical inference was written by a philosopher, Ian Hacking.

Some professionals don't even like the urn model for explaining SW reliability (you know who you are! :-) ). But I think it's pretty good for some purposes, even though in Annex D it just seems to be stuck on like a Post-It note.

I think there are good reasons for explaining software reliability engineering in straightforward terms to people who are not expert. So I wrote a note using the urn model and the interpretation of (some kinds of) software into the urn model. I use it to refute two mistaken claims that I have recently heard and read.


PBL Prof. Peter Bernard Ladkin, Faculty of Technology, University of Bielefeld, 33594 Bielefeld, Germany Je suis Charlie
Tel+msg +49 (0)521 880 7319 www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de

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