Re: [SystemSafety] Degraded software performance [diverged from Fault, Failure and Reliability Again]

From: Matthew Squair < >
Date: Fri, 6 Mar 2015 18:18:21 +1100


So after all that discussion did we resolve anything?

Matthew Squair

MIEAust, CPEng
Mob: +61 488770655
Email; Mattsquair_at_xxxxxx
Web: http://criticaluncertainties.com

On 6 Mar 2015, at 12:38 pm, Les Chambers <les_at_xxxxxx

  Nick

In support of your ideas I offer the following:

Peter's paper on software reliability presents a theoretical paradigm (or pattern of thinking). If it included experimental evidence that it faithfully explained the observed behaviour of software in the real world it could be classed as a practical paradigm and as such become a tool of engineering. It clearly has not reached that stage. In fact I would shrink from rating it with the geocentric theories of Aristotle and Ptolemy, that had the sun revolving around the earth. That paradigm did have some utility, in that it did explain some aspects of the motions of the planets. There were anomalies however. Observations that weren't explained by the accepted paradigm. Even though the heliocentric model existed as early as 300 BC, (refer, Aristarchus of Samos) astronomers practiced wilful denial of geocentric anomalies, encouraged by religious faith and the threat of indictment as a heretic. It took roughly 1800 years for Copernicus and fellow travellers, Johannes Kepler and Galileo Galilei to announce that the King had no clothes and the heliocentric paradigm provided a better explanation. On the order of Pope Paul V, Galileo seemed to suffer most for his honesty, being dragged before an inquisition and forced to recant. But more on this later.

Back on subject, I assert that:

  1. Standards are tools of engineering (they are definitely not a publishing vehicle for scientific theories).
  2. Given that there does not exist a paradigm that adequately explains the observed behaviour of software in the reliability context, in a broad enough set of computing environments, all references to theoretical candidates should be deleted from 61508.

As I have said before, anyone developing or maintaining a standard should be solidly focused on its audience and end use. This standard is attached to contracts. When this happens development organisations must factor in the cost of compliance. This becomes difficult to estimate as practitioners spend endless meetings arguing the point with clients over immature theoretical paradigms, not to mention the expensive and unproductive games that are played around claiming compliance with clauses that offer more a slippery idea than a hard validatable fact/rule/process. This adds cost to complex systems development and reduces industry productivity while adding zero value to the end product. The 61508 team should reflect on this.

Further, in many of the posts on this subject, I have noted a degree of cringing before Peter's mathematical elegance. Sentences such as "I am not a mathematician ... I'm not qualified to judge ... ". I encourage these respondents to think like engineers. It is not necessary to understand the details of Peter's theory (I lost the ability to prove Maxwell's equations decades ago). All we need from him is a set of experimental results that prove PBL Paradigm X (described in terms of implementable rules, equations and processes) adequately explains the behaviour we observe in the real world (frankly I don't care how many papers he's published in the past). This is the standard engineering attitude - it's harsh but fair.

RE: The IEC's bureaucratic inability to delete bad elements of existing standards:

One solution is to open 61508 to broader review and comment. At the SCSC symposium in Bristol I asked Peter if there was a mechanism for practitioners (such as I) to comment on drafts of 61508 - as I have in the past with IEEE standards. I received two responses, one verbal and the other nonverbal. Both of them gave me grave concern.

  1. The verbal: "The IEC believes it has a process that works ... Comments on the standard are confined to committee members." (or words to that effect)
  2. The non verbal: he looked at me as though I had just broken wind. The sort of look you get from the functionaries in the Paris Ritz when you approach the Hemingway Bar in a pair of jeans and dusty shoes - unwashed and unworthy.

My point is this: the 61508 maintenance effort must not be the domain of an exclusive club of wise men. It must be opened for comment from its end users - engineers. Further, the makeup of the committee should be biased in favour of engineers as opposed to scientists (is this true now? How many people on that committee have ever had direct responsibility in any capacity for any element of a safety critical system? Especially responsibility for making the case to the client that a development organisation has complied).

If it's broken engineers should have the power to fix it, simply because we are its end users.

RE: Reducing 61508 to practice

In reading the posts on this subject I have the sense of wilful denial not unlike that of the astronomers of old. It's been stated that IEC 61508-7 Annex D is anomalous (just like the geocentric model of astronomy), but we are powerless to fix it for political (religious?) reasons.

Who runs the IEC: the Pope? What do you fear: excommunication? I say to the people on the committee, "Try harder. Do what is right and damn the torpedoes."

For normative guidance: If cull we must, let's apply a test. There are two simple questions you could ask about any element of the standard.

  1. Is this paradigm supported by empirical evidence?
  2. Is this paradigm supported by the engineering community.

And as for Peter; press on mate. We could be witnessing the birth of a novel theory. Have courage, ignore the critics. Remember Galileo as they dragged him out of the inquisition toward internal exile, mumbling "Eppur si muove" (and yet it moves). But please reconsider including theoretical paradigms in a standard that cries out for practical implementability. Instead, get back to us when you have some compelling experimental evidence (engineers are a patient lot, we're capable of waiting 1800 years).

... And, in the meantime, consider pushing for:

  1. Deletion of Annex D and any of its theoretical ilk.
  2. Broader industry review of 61508 drafts so the people who suffer from its shortcomings can at last have a say.
  3. A reduction in price to the point where an average Joe can afford to read it.

Cheers

Les

*From:* systemsafety-bounces_at_xxxxxx mailto:systemsafety-bounces_at_xxxxxx <systemsafety-bounces_at_xxxxxx Tudor
*Sent:* Thursday, March 5, 2015 7:42 PM
*To:* Peter Bernard Ladkin
*Cc:* The System Safety List
*Subject:* Re: [SystemSafety] Degraded software performance [diverged from
Fault, Failure and Reliability Again]

Peter et al

I am going to close my input to this thread with the following:

This thread was started based upon the request for feedback on the idea of software reliability; I think that request has been fulfilled in spades and is a good use of this forum. There is a plan to update a standard IEC61508 with material about how one might use software reliability in safety systems. Standards are supposed to represent the consensus of the community and it has been reported by others on this list that many standards do not recognise this approach. Some of these standards claim to be based upon the template of IEC61508, EN50128 being a good example and ISO26262 being a bad one. Neither of these recognise 'software reliability' and, as I and others have pointed out, the aerospace standard DO-178C and its predecessors don't either. These bodies of work represent quite a consensus in the community that there is no recognised basis for the use of software reliability. While I know that for example, the UK H&SE have been briefed by consultants the notion that such a phenomenon exists, it has, in my and many others views in the UK, held back the sensible use of software in systems. It continues to hamper efforts to update aged and ageing analogue nuclear power systems (for which there are no like-for-like analogue parts manufactured any more) with digital systems. This is costing the industry and, much more importantly, the tax payer and is not necessarily helping make the systems safer, only more costly.

I was fortunately able to support the working groups for DO-178C and continue to do so. Like many in industry, I cannot afford the time nor the money to support more than one. It is therefore beholden upon those who can support such fora that they take note of the wider consensus.

Standards are there to help industry to do many things, one of which is to control costs. Basing development on a phenomenon that does not have consensus across the discipline of computer science/software engineering would be a disservice to the wider community. I therefore request that the proposed update to 61508 removes any reference to software reliability.

  Nick Tudor

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On 5 March 2015 at 06:24, Peter Bernard Ladkin <ladkin_at_xxxxxx wrote:

I think that Drew has pointed out a number of phenomena which result in software changing
inadvertently and/or unobserved over time. Attributing the causes of those phenomena to "SW" or "HW"
is I suggest of secondary interest. What is of primary interest is that they do occur and as a
result software changes/can so change with the passage of time.

Suppose one wants to talk about that phenomenon. To me, "software degradation" seems a reasonable
term to use. Others may prefer to invent another term.

It's clear to me that the phenomena (maybe not all of them, but at least some) do occur/have
occurred and anyone preserving critical software for any length of time should take them into
account; devise detection and prophylaxis mechanisms and so on. Sort of like hardware, really.

PBL Prof. Peter Bernard Ladkin, Faculty of Technology, University of Bielefeld, 33594 Bielefeld, Germany
Je suis Charlie
Tel+msg +49 (0)521 880 7319 www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de



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