Re: [SystemSafety] UAV / UAS / RPAS System Safety, or not!

From: Matthew Squair < >
Date: Mon, 9 Mar 2015 17:58:38 +1100

Well, actually no luck required. Apparently the lack of formal (funded) safety programs is no impediment to improving safety.

In fact I'd go so far as to say that the USAF should continue with business as usual. :)

Safety: USN naval aviation vs USAF drones | Critical Uncertainties

Matthew Squair

MIEAust, CPEng
Mob: +61 488770655
Email; Mattsquair_at_xxxxxx

On 9 Mar 2015, at 7:26 am, S Whiteley <simon_at_xxxxxx

Hi everyone, this article popped up on google this afternoon regarding UAS in the US.

If your not in UAS/UAV/RPAS circles, it'll open your eyes. If you're in those circles, good luck!

This bit is interesting:
"Although many military UAS have not undergone a system safety analysis in
accordance with the military's Standard Practice for System Safety (MIL-STD-882), acceptance by the military is currently an FAA criteria for considering a UAS safe for operation under restricted operating rules."!!! (Emphasis added!)

And this bit:
"The lack of airworthiness certification and system safety assessments of
military UAS has not gone unnoticed by NATO allies purchasing U.S.-manufactured UAS (DCDC, 2011). The U.K. Ministry of Defense (MOD) began to independently evaluate UAS coming from the U.S. in 2007 following hundreds of UAS mishap reports. MOD noted that these UAS lacked a safety analysis required by defense standards and voiced its criticism during a meeting of the Technical Cooperation Program. Considerable differences between safety programs can only be partially explained by the amount of money spent in each country. According to Steve Mattem of the International System Safety Society, MOD budgets a greater percentage of its acquisition funds toward system safety programs than does the DOD." Well done MOD.

Rather concerning, given the high significance of Software:
"Another concern is that even those UAS that have had a system safety
analysis conducted in accordance with DOD acquisition regulations would not likely meet the more rigorous FAA requirements. DOD did not formally adopt functional hazard analysis techniques that are the norm for commercial aircraft programs following the Society of Automotive Engineer's Aerospace Recommended Practices into MIL-STD-882E until 2012. The military also has never fully adopted a software certification standard meeting the criteria of Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) Document DO-178C." Without FHA, then, well, that's just bonkers.



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systemsafety_at_xxxxxx Received on Mon Mar 09 2015 - 07:58:52 CET

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