Re: [SystemSafety] Modelling and coding guidelines: "Unambiguous Graphical Representation"

From: GRAZEBROOK, Alvery N < >
Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2016 09:35:31 +0000


In response to your note, I think you are conflating 2 issues:

There are some similarities, but in the first case you are trying to gain advantage by proven characteristics actually being met, whereas in the second case you are trying to gain advantage by accepting the design process carried out by the previous group of designers. These are very different things.



From: systemsafety [mailto:systemsafety-bounces_at_xxxxxx ...

The argument about trusting proven in use components has been completely disproved by the Ariane 501 flight and its consequences. A proven-in-use component in one environment may be replete with defects that may emerge in another environment. It also has disproved most ways of thinking probabilities of failure for software-dependent systems.


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systemsafety_at_xxxxxx Received on Mon Mar 14 2016 - 10:35:44 CET

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