On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 10:37 PM, Tim Schürmann < tschuerm_at_xxxxxx
> Hi Bertrand,
> if i get you right, you're saying: One needs to access/address the
> previous experience/knowledge of a person (with respect to culture/work
> etc.) to make sure the underlying mental model of understanding/meaning
> is similar/the same?
>
> Regards
> Tim
>
> On Do, 2016-04-21 at 12:25 +0000, RICQUE Bertrand (SAGEM DEFENSE
> SECURITE) wrote:
> > Hi Les,
> >
> > This is very interesting. We had some few weeks ago a discussion about
> the meaning of integrity in a French workgroup. It happens that in French,
> the meaning of "intégrité" encompasses the same scope that the meaning of
> integrity in English, but that among the different meanings the "moral" one
> appears after the "untouched/intact" meaning.
> >
> > Thus for the reader of a standard, the first connotation that comes in
> mind is not the same. One can even doubt about the relevancy of standards
> using undefined(or weakly defined) terms leading to such diverse
> interpretations..
> >
> > Looking in standards, we were trying to find the technical
> "sub-attributes" of "integrity" and it appeared to us that this was not
> defined in any sector. There is a kind of "feeling" that it has some
> relationship with systematic errors/failures but there is nothing further.
> >
> > That's the reason why we are currently working on the technical content
> associated with the term. Could we define a metric for integrity ? E.g. has
> a system with 75% coverage diagnostics more integrity than a system with 50
> % ? Are there features or attributes building integrity ? Etc...
> >
> > Bertrand Ricque
> > Program Manager
> > Optronics and Defence Division
> > Sights Program
> > Mob : +33 6 87 47 84 64
> > Tel : +33 1 58 11 96 82
> > Bertrand.ricque_at_xxxxxx
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Les Chambers [mailto:les_at_xxxxxx
> > Sent: Thursday, April 21, 2016 2:10 PM
> > To: 'Peter Bernard Ladkin'; RICQUE Bertrand (SAGEM DEFENSE SECURITE);
> 'Andy Ashworth'; 'Christopher Johnson';
> systemsafety_at_xxxxxx
> > Subject: RE: [SystemSafety] Does "reliable" mean "safe" and or "secure"
> or neither?
> >
> > Peter
> > On your pronouncement: "This is utter nonsense"
> > I am surprised at such a subjective turn of phrase for one who alleges
> to be a seeker of objective definition. Get a grip son. The sentence is
> laced with pride and lacks intellectual rigour. It ranks with "this is
> s..t" or "I'm surrounded by idiots!"
> >
> > Further, it lacks integrity because it does not support the end-to-end
> process of corrective action. In this sense it is not whole or entire.
> Decades of sitting in engineering reviews has taught me that such emotional
> and ambiguous utterances such as this waste people's time, a precious
> commodity when you're building systems with other people's money.
> > In contrast, explicit defect definitions such as: incorrect fact,
> ambiguity, standards non-compliance, inconsistent with our observations of
> ... cut to the chase pointing the author to exactly where he or she needs
> to go to either correct the defect or further justify the statement. It
> also focuses on the work not the person. "utter nonsense" implies
> foolishness in the author (I note that I am not offended. I do not crave
> your gratitude for my posts. Gratitude has a short memory, better to say
> what one thinks because one thinks it is right).
> > In addition, your defect definition does not explicitly identify the
> element of the offending paragraph that requires correction. Which part do
> you find nonsensical?
> >
> > As it happens my reference to the secular seeker of moral clarity
> conflicting with religious faith is consistent with what I have observed.
> It is based on a personal experience where I accidentally trod on a seminar
> participant's strongly held religious beliefs. But that's another story ...
> > The end result unfortunately was that the conversation stopped. What
> positive ideas that may have come out of the interaction were lost. Hence
> the need for caution in these areas. Anger snuffs out the lamp of the mind.
> >
> > On: 'we use the word "integrity" for it, because one has to have a word
> for it and that's as good as any' ...
> >
> > I think we can do better than this. These words need to trigger states
> of mind and ultimately action. This can't happen if they're not understood
> or remembered. The literature of rhetoric and storytelling is way ahead of
> the engineering profession on this. I'm constantly amazed at how well the
> story theorists have turned the subjective into useful objective patterns
> that integrate so well with the way our brains are wired and influence us.
> Why do you think we will never forget:
> >
> > Never in the field of human conflict has so much been owed by so many to
> so few
> >
> > You remember this as soon as you hear it because it's a classic
> ascending tricolon. Orators since before Cicero have known that people find
> this rule of three satisfying, complete and motivating. Very useful if you
> need to pad out a bad argument with rhetoric. Integrity on the cheap.
> >
> > Churchill did it again after the Battle of Al Alamein
> >
> > Now this is not the end.
> > It is not even the beginning of the end.
> > But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.
> >
> > Another tricolon this time with chiasmus (swapping beginning and end).
> >
> > And to round out my rule of threes, another one. In the 1920s F Scott
> Fitzgerald blew away the literary community with:
> >
> > "That’s my middle-west—not the wheat or prairies or the lost Swede towns
> but the thrilling, returning trains of my youth and the street lamps and
> sleigh bells in the frosty dark and the shadows of holly wreaths thrown by
> lighted windows on the snow."
> >
> > My overall point is that the states of mind and thought patterns of
> human beings can be influenced by words presented in the right patterns.
> The engineering profession should know more about this, especially as we
> attempt to program "higher" intelligence into computers. Further, high
> integrity systems are created by high integrity people. Looking into and
> defining what constitutes integrity in human behaviour is the sacred
> mission of us all, including the standards developer. So get on with it.
> >
> > Cheers
> > Les
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Peter Bernard Ladkin [mailto:ladkin_at_xxxxxx
> > Sent: Thursday, April 21, 2016 1:00 PM
> > To: Les Chambers; 'RICQUE Bertrand (SAGEM DEFENSE SECURITE)'; 'Andy
> Ashworth'; 'Christopher Johnson';
> systemsafety_at_xxxxxx
> > Subject: Re: [SystemSafety] Does "reliable" mean "safe" and or "secure"
> or neither?
> >
> > Les,
> >
> > On 2016-04-20 23:18 , Les Chambers wrote:
> > > But here's the thing, any standards body that goes down this path will
> > > soon encroach upon the territory of established religion whose moral
> codes often diverge even though their collective central core is probably
> the same.
> >
> > That is utter nonsense.
> >
> > We are talking about properties of systems and code and trying to figure
> out which of them are objective and which not. Most of us in standards want
> to be able to define something like the trustworthiness of a system, in
> this case with respect to safety or security properties, and we use the
> word "integrity" for it, because one has to have a word for it and that's
> as good as any. No one has yet succeeded in defining an objective property,
> in the way in which many people have succeeded in defining objectively what
> it is for code to fulfil its specification. I guess we shall continue to
> try until we succeed.
> >
> > BTW, I was preoccupied with other things yesterday and failed to notice,
> until too late, that what I thought had become a private chat, between four
> people who know each other, wasn't. Participants here will appreciate at
> least in principle that my private chatter differs in style from my public
> communication. Mea culpa. I hope no one was offended.
> >
> > PBL
> >
> > Prof. Peter Bernard Ladkin, Faculty of Technology, University of
> Bielefeld, 33594 Bielefeld, Germany Je suis Charlie
> > Tel+msg +49 (0)521 880 7319 www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
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> --
> Kind Regards
> Tim Schürmann
>
>
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--
*Matthew Squair*
BEng (Mech) MSysEng
MIEAust CPEng
Mob: +61 488770655
Email: MattSquair_at_xxxxxx
Website: www.criticaluncertainties.com <http://criticaluncertainties.com/>
Received on Fri Apr 22 2016 - 00:17:21 CEST
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